I. INTRODUCTION On November 22, 1999, thirteen Cuban nationals boarded a small boat attempting to reach the United States (U.S.).I The boat capsized off the shore of Florida in the midst of strong winds and rough seas, killing eleven of these individuals.
2 One of the survivors was a five year-old boy named Elian Gonzalez. 3 The public attention and legal drama that followed remains fresh in the memory of most of us; often conjuring up a myriad of images and deeply held opinions. Although Elian's case may have forced the public's attention onto the complexities involved in international custody disputes, one unavoidable legacy remains-his case is atypical. ' While the Elian Gonzalez case was unfolding, a Florida state court was considering a case more illustrative of typical international custody disputes, albeit with very little publicity. In 1995, Maria Pereria and Ibrahim Shanti married in Miami and moved back to Jordan, where they then had a baby boy. 5 In 1999, Maria and their son returned to Florida on vacation and subsequently refused to return to Jordan. 6 In 2000, ensuing legal action resulted in a Florida court ordering the two year-old boy returned to lbrahim in Jordan, and further, that the courts in Jordan resolve any custody disputes. 7 It is precisely this type of case which gives rise to the many challenges inherent in international custody disputes. aspiration of the Hague Convention is to deter a parent's temptation to abduct his/her child and then take the child to another nation in hopes of receiving a more favorable custody determination in the courts of that nation. 2 " The Hague Convention is made up of six chapters and forty-five articles. 21 Currently, only sixty-eight nations are signatory members to the Hague Convention. 22 The Hague Convention is primarily jurisdictional in nature. 23 Since the Hague Convention envisions the swift return of the child to the nation he/she was abducted from, its language is void of any suggestions pertaining to determinations of custody issues. 2 4 In fact, its design simply addresses the issue of whether a child has been wrongfully removed from one nation to another (or wrongfully retained in another nation), and if so, provides the procedural basis in which to secure the return of that child to his/her home 21 nation. Critics have argued that this structure ignores the civil rights of the child by assuring that the child's best interests will not be considered. 6 18. See Starr, supra note 11, at 792. 26 . See Starr, supra note 11, at 830. Professor Starr argued that the Hague Convention appears "retrograde" since it does not act on behalf of the child nor contemplate the civil rights of the child, especially when considering the international community's growing concern with children's rights over the last half century. See id.
See
[Vol. 12:2 THE UN-COMMON LAW The heart of the Hague Convention is set out in Articles 3 and 12.27 Article 3 defines "wrongful removal or retention" as a breach of custodial rights pursuant to the laws of the abducted-from nation, while "Article 12 provides the remedy once a 'wrongful removal or retention' has been found to have occurred., 28 
B. Essential Elements & Concepts of the Hague Convention
In order for the Hague Convention to apply, the following three elements must be present (pursuant to Articles 3, 4, and 35): 1) a child under sixteen years of age; 2) who has been "wrongfully" removed from his/her state of "habitual residence" in breach of a left-behind parent's custody right (which the parent was exercising at the time of removal; 3) while the Hague Convention was in effect. 29 The first element is self-explanatory. In the second element, "wrongful removal" typically occurs when a child is taken to another nation by a non-custodial parent; while "wrongful retention" typically occurs when a custodial parent keeps a child in another nation for a period of time longer than (legally) permitted. 30 Defining "habitual residence" is slightly more complicated. The Hague Convention does not define the term "habitual residence," which according to commentators, was not an oversight. 3 ' Instead, the drafters regarded this as a question of fact and thought it best to afford some interpretive discretion upon the courts without constraining them with some type of standardized meaning. 32 The common meaning given to the term "habitual residence" is "the place which is the focus of the child's life, where the child is permanently and physically present, and where the child's day-today existence is centered." 33 When making this determination, courts have considered factors such as whether a custodial parent was honest about his/her intention to live in a separate nation; whether the custodial parent consented to the other parent leaving the nation with the child; and the amount of time the child has actually been a resident of the abducted-from nationA 4 27. See Herring, supra note 21, at 149. Commentators refer to this as a "settled purpose. ' 35 In other words, is there a sufficient degree of continuity in living where one does? 36 If so, habitual residence is likely to be found. 37 If these elements are met, then Article 12 becomes applicable. 38 Article 12 mandates the judicial authority of the petitioned nation to order the immediate return of the child. 39 Again, this complies with one of the principle objectives of the Hague Convention-to secure the prompt return of wrongfully removed or retained children to the nation from which they have been removed from or kept from returning to.4
C. Affirmative Exceptions Under the Hague Convention
Based on the foregoing, if a child under the age of sixteen years of age has been wrongfully removed or retained from his/her nation of habitual residence (and a Hague Convention proceeding has been initiated within one year 4 ), Article 12 mandates the court in the petitioned-to nation to order the return of the child. 42 However, the Hague Convention does provide six exceptions which permit the petitioned authority in the abducted-to nation to refuse ordering the return of a child. 43 A court may refuse to order the return of a child when: 1) the custodial parent consented or acquiesced to the removal 38. See Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 12. "Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith." Id.
39 [Vol. 12:2 THE UN-COMMON LAW or retention; 2) the custodial parent failed to exercise his/her custodial rights; 3) the child is settled in his/her new environment; 4) the return is not permitted by the requested nation's fundamental principles regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms; 5) the return poses a "grave risk" of exposing the child to physical or psychological harm or an intolerable situation; and 6) the child objects to returning and is old enough and mature enough to make such objections." For purposes of this note, numbers one through four of the aforementioned will be briefly examined, while numbers five and six will remain the primary focus because they directly effect the interests and wishes of the child, and thus, become entangled with the area of children's rights. First, where the custodial parent actually consented or subsequently acquiesced to the other parent's removal of the child, a ruling court may exercise its discretion in whether or not to order the child's return.
4 5 The presence of consent or acquiescence actually negates one of the fundamental elements of the Hague Convention-that the removal or retention be "wrongful." 46 Without a wrongful removal the applicability of the Hague Convention is directly at issue, and in such circumstances, courts are not mandated by the Article 12 duty to order the return of the child. 47 However, a claim of consent or acquiescence is narrowly interpreted by the courts, probably in order to refrain from undermining the purpose of the Hague Convention.
48
Another exception to the Hague Convention's mandatory return ideal involves the issue of whether the petitioning parent was actually exercising his/her custody rights, in which the petitioning parent must establish not only that custody rights existed, but also that those rights were being exercised. 4 This exception is also interlinked with the fundamental determination of whether the abduction or retention is wrongful. 5° The Hague Convention presumes that a person who actually has custody rights is also exercising them. 5 ' The burden in this exception falls on the abductor to prove otherwise, which usually means that "very little is required of the applicant to support an allegation that custody rights were actually being exercised prior to the abduction."" Article 12 also contains a "child is settled" exception to mandatory return, which is dependant upon the time that has elapsed from the moment of abduction or retention to the filing of the Hague Convention petition. 3 The defense is that the child has settled into his/her new environment, and specifically calls into question the legitimacy of the mandate set forth in Article 12.' Thus, while Article 12's mandate applying to proceedings that have been commenced within one year appears dispositive, proceedings filed after the expiration of one year are permitted to escape the mandatory order of return if the child is settled in his/her new environment. 55 At issue here is the concern that "if the child remains too long in a new residence, the child will undergo another major uprooting if he or she is returned." 5 6 Thus, this defense attempts to benefit from a fundamental objective of the Hague Convention-that the child's best interest is to secure his/her prompt return.
57
The less prompt the return, the less likely the Hague Convention's goals are being preserved. Finally, Article 20 permits a court to refuse to order the return of a child when, to do so, would violate the fundamental human rights principles held by 50. See Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 3(b). In order for the removal or retention to be considered wrongful, Article 3(b) states that: "at the time of removal or retention those rights [meaning custody rights] were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention." Id.
51. See Herring, supra note 21, at 160. The Hague Convention is built upon the presumption that "'the person who has custody rights was actually exercising that custody." Id.
52. Id. at 160-61; see also Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 8(c) (any person filing a petition pursuant to the Hague Convention must include in their application "the grounds on which the applicant's claim for return of the child is based"). This informal requirement is essentially all that is required in order to establish the proper exercise of custody rights. See Herring, supra note 21, at 160-61.
53. See Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 12 (mandating an order of return if, among other things, the proceedings have been commenced less than one year from the date of wrongful removal or retention). If, however, the proceedings have been initiated after the expiration of one year, Article 12 still mandates an order of return, "unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment." Id.
54 The aforementioned exceptions have been presented for background and clarity purposes. The remainder of this note will focus primarily on the last two exceptions. Although the "human rights" exception of Article 20 also appears to raise the issue of children's rights, it nonetheless remains contingent on the policies of the requested nation (and that nation's stance on matters of human rights) rather than the interests, wishes, or rights of the child. Conversely, the "grave risk of harm" and "child's objections" exceptions" are directly connected to the interests of the child-one with respect to the child's views and the other with the child's well-being.
1.

Grave Risk Of Harm Exception-Generally
Article 13(b) allows a court to refuse ordering the return of a child when the return poses a "grave risk" of exposing the child to physical or psychological harm or an intolerable situation. 2 This is the most commonly used defense under the Hague Convention. 63 Typically, this exception is construed narrowly, and was intended to be raised when it was established that the child itself (not the abducting parent) would be placed in an intolerable situation if returned to his/her nation of habitual residence.6" The drafters 58 . See Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 20. A court may refuse to order a child's return "if this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms." Id.
59. See Herring, supra note 21, at 170-7 1. During drafting, there was some controversy over the role, if any, that public policy should play in determining whether to order the return of the child. See id. Indeed, an earlier alternative draft permitted refusal when the return was "deemed 'manifestly incompatible with the fundamental principles of the law relating to family' issues." Id. However, the drafters concluded that such policy discretion could undermine the Hague Convention's effect. See id. Thus, the current version reflects a limitation on a nation's discretion by only affording such cultural incompatibility considerations when matters relating to the child's human rights are involved. See id. recognized that in some instances ordering a child to return to the abductedfrom nation could be more disastrous than allowing a foreign jurisdiction to decide the matter. 65 Thus, the drafters wanted to afford some discretion to the courts in order to recognize the realities inherent in ordering a child to return to his/her place of habitual residence." The "intolerable situation" component requires that the posed risk go beyond mere trivial complaints, and calls for the situation to be "extreme and compelling" in nature. 67 Accordingly, courts usually require a high degree of risk that returning the child will likely lead to physical or psychological harm.
6
" Simply claiming it would be better for the child (i.e., due to some financial or educational advantages) to stay in the abducted-to nation will not satisfy this requirement. 69 When considering whether a "grave risk" exists, courts also look to the source of the harm. 70 In other words, is the potential for harm posed by the nation that the child would be returned to, or is the risk posed by the child's return to the non-abducting parent? 7 ' The general notion regarding this distinction is that if the risk is one posed by being returned to the nonabducting parent, then the issue before the court more closely resembles a custody matter. 7 2 Since custody determinations often entail findings of parental fitness, courts usually assume that the child's state of habitual residence is better suited to resolve such issues. 73 Thus, the abducting parent bears a heavy burden that requires more than claiming the other parent is unfit. 74 The Hague Convention was designed to deter parents from seeking more favorable international forums to resolve custody determinations, and as [T] he effect would have been to drive a coach and horses through the provisions of this Convention, since it would be open to any abducting parent to raise allegations under [A]rticle 13 and then to use those allegations as a tactic for delaying the hearing by saying that oral evidence must be heard, information must be obtained . 74. See id. Courts have tried to promote the goals of the Hague Convention by requiring a "substantial" showing of a risk of physical or psychological harm in order to demonstrate that the abducting parent will have to do more than simply assert that the other parent is unfit. See id.
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The more likely event in which a court will find the Article 13(b) exception to be applicable is when returning a child to his/her nation of habitual residence (not to the parent) poses the grave risk of harm to the child. 76 Practically, this only occurs when the child's return places him/her in danger due to some existent condition, such as war or a recent natural disaster. 77 Critics argue that this unnecessarily restricts the purpose of Article 13(b), since Article 20 permits a court to refuse returning a child in order to protect the child's human rights. 7 '
However, without such conditions, narrowly construing this exception remains intact in that the child will almost always be ordered to return.
Child's Objection Exception--Generally
Article 13 also permits a court to refuse to order the return of a child when the child objects to being returned and is old enough and mature enough This interpretation though helpful in limiting the scope of 13(b), does not appear to be consistent with 13(b)'s focus on "conduct of the parties and the interest of the child." Moreover, such interpretation appears redundant in light of the Article 20 exception, which excepts return when return is inconsistent with fundamental principles of the requested State relating to protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Thus, Article 20-but not 13(b)-is directed to concerns about harms arising from the child's return to a particular country. Id. Moreover, the concluding paragraph of Article 13 requires that some criteria be considered when applying this exception that is not wholly dependent upon the state of affairs of the abducted-from nation. See Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 13 (when considering defenses offered under Article 13, courts must "take into account the information relating to the social background of the child").
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to make such an objection. 79 This exception is closely related to the Hague Convention's age requirement.'o The drafters were aware of the fact that there might be situations where the Hague Convention should be inapplicable to a child otherwise subject to it if, under the laws of the petitioned nation, the child would be free to choose his/her own place of residence." 1 Therefore, the drafters decided, albeit somewhat reluctantly, that the courts should retain some discretion to consider the views of the child. 2 The drafters could not agree on a minimum age trigger, however, but "were unanimous in bestowing discretion in the application of the Child's Objection Clause to the competent authorities." 3 It was believed that affording such discretion was more preferable than lowering the overall age of the Hague Convention's applicability.'
The child's objection exception essentially contains two issues that a court must consider: first, whether the child objects; and second, whether the child is old enough or mature enough to have his/her objection considered. 5 Generally, the first issue regarding the nature of the objection requires a demonstration that the child's objection is more than just a mere preference to remain with an abducting parent. 8 6 This reflects one of the major criticisms of the child's objection exception, which is that the objection could be the product of undue influence by the abducting parent. 87 The second issue involving the age and/or maturity of the child is more complicated. Essentially, a court must determine whether a child has reached an age or maturity level which satisfies the court that the child's views should be considered in the decision-making process. 8 However, since the Hague Convention specifies neither a threshold age nor objective assessment criteria, 79 . See Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 13. The second paragraph of Article 13 states that a court may "refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views." Id. 443-44 (1996) . Nanos argues that the "Child's Objection Clause represents a compromise of two significant competing interests-the desire to expand the scope and application of the Convention versus the situation of children under sixteen who have the right to choose their own place of residence." Id.
See
82. See Nanos, supra note 81, at 444. 83. Id.
See id. ("[G]
ranting judicial discretion was preferable to a lowering of the overall age which would reduce the Convention's scope."). 85 . See Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 13. 86. See Herring, supra note 21, at 164. 87. See Nanos, supra note 81, at 447. Critics are concerned that the child's objection "may be the product of 'brainwashing' by the abducting parent." Id. This exception requires a case by case application of the facts in order to determine "whether the child is in fact expressing an objection that has arisen out of his or her own free will or whether the objection has been influenced by other parties." Herring, supra note 21, at 164
88. See Herring, supra note 21, at 165.
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there is legitimate concern that the child's objection exception may be subject to arbitrary application.
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Such concern about arbitrary and inconsistent application is not without merit. Indeed, there have been cases holding that nine, ten, and twelve yearolds are not of sufficient age in order to merit consideration of their views under Article 13; while conversely, there have been cases holding that eleven, twelve, and thirteen year-old children are of sufficient age. 9 " However, if the exception is to live up to its purpose, 9 then perhaps such decisions do not represent an absence of consistency, but instead reflect an independent application of the facts on a case-by-case basis. 92 The criticisms of the child's objection exception are plenty, and for the most part are beyond the scope of this note. In addition to the aforementioned concern regarding the true nature of the child's objection (i.e., whether it is "the product of 'brainwashing' by the abducting parent" 93 ), one major concern is that the exception could counter the effect of Article 19 and enable a petitioned court to actually resolve the merits of a custody dispute. 94 Perhaps the strongest criticism is the concern that the exception is subject to judicial abuse. 95 Particularly at issue here is the presiding judicial officer's temptation to favor the social and cultural conditions of the petitioned nation. 96 As the preceding indicates, the crux of concern surrounding the child's objection exception lies in the discretion afforded to judicial authorities and the potential for its abuse. 97 However, it is worth restating that the drafters of the Hague
See id.
(Since the Hague Convention does not set forth a threshold age which triggers automatic consideration, such a determination is reserved to the courts); see Nanos, supra note 81, at 445. Article 13 fails to establish both a minimum age component and objective assessment criteria, and as a result "invites potential subjective and arbitrary decision making." Id.
90 Specific approaches in the way the U.S. and the U.K. courts interpret both the grave risk of harm and child's objection exceptions will be more specifically discussed in Parts IV and V, respectively. Before that, however, some attention must be given to the emergence and international developments surrounding the concept of children's rights.
IH. THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD & THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
In all actions concerning children... the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
-UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
99
A.
International Aspects of the Children's Rights Movement
The children's rights movement is the product of a long struggle, and is predominantly a creature of the twentieth century."° Historically, children were often viewed as nothing more than personal property, which is reflected in the legal history of both European and U.S. law and social policy dating back to the Middle Ages.'' To illustrate this unfortunate historical reality, many point to what is commonly referred to as the "Mary Ellen affair."' 0 2 The Mary Ellen affair involved the prosecution of New York parents in 1874 for chaining their daughter to a bed and giving her only bread and water.'l 3 Given the lack of legal precedence for child protection, the prosecutor relied heavily on drawing an analogy with an animal cruelty law." This case is often used 98. See id. at 444. After concluding that an exception to consider the views of the child was "absolutely necessary," the drafters of the Hague Convention "were unanimous in bestowing discretion in the application of the Child's Objection Clause to the competent authorities." Id.
99. [Vol. 12:2 THE UN-COMMON LAW to demonstrate that in both the U.S. and the U.K, laws against cruelty to animals were enacted before child abuse protection statutes.' 05 Perhaps questioning such social priorities sparked thoughts of reassessment and reflection concerning the area of children's rights. But regardless of rationale, the latter half of the twentieth century has unquestionably shown that the international community is concerned with the rights of children."°'
Many international treaties and procedures were implemented which reflected the growing desire to protect the rights of children.' 0 7 The most significant development in the international advancement and recognition of children's rights occurred in 1959, when the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration of the Rights of the Child (UN Declaration).' 0 8 The task was not an easy one, and was actually the culmination of a drafting process that began in the late 1940's.'0 9 Many nations had their reservations, however, with most preferring to limit the declaration to the "essential" rights." 0 Nonetheless, the declaration incorporated fundamental human rights principles from the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights;"' a notably distinct approach from the days of the Mary Ellen affair.
Most UN member nations opposed the creation of a binding treaty at the time the UN Declaration was adopted." 2 However, in the twenty years that followed the UN Declaration's adoption in 1959, the international community began to recognize a need to focus on the human rights of children." 3 charter that would be binding on States." ' " l 5 The task of drafting this charter was assigned to the UN Commission on Human Rights," 6 and would take approximately ten years to complete." 7 The Commission's result was a binding international treaty that boldly introduced the international community to the concept that the child's best interests were now a matter of paramount concern."1 8
B. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
In 1989, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the UN Convention which subsequently went into effect (in record time) by September of 1990. '9 No other international treaty has ever been welcomed with the near universal acceptance that the UN Convention has.
E° In fact, the only UN member nations that have not ratified the UN Convention are Somalia and the U.S.' The international accord seeks to "build consensus for the concept of children as holders of their own human rights," and is responsible for changing the "deeply rooted historical attitudes toward children that have prevented them from enjoying their rights."' 12 2 The UN Convention is often regarded as 115. Id.; see Starr, supra note 11, at 830. Interestingly, this task was assumed during the same time representatives to the Hague Convention were drafting their agreement to deal with the aspects of international child abduction. See id. As Professor Starr noted: While one group of lawyers and lawmakers was meeting at the Hague in 1980 to draw up a Convention to prevent parental abduction of children to other countries, another group of child advocates and lawmakers... was convening to develop a draft copy of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Id.
116. See Rios-Kohn, supra note 100, at 140 (the Commission on Human Rights reported to the Economic and Social Council of the UN). The actual drafting of the UN Convention was assumed by the "Working Group for the Rights of Children," which would meet one week per year just prior to when the UN Commission on Human Rights would meet. See Starr, supra note 11, at 830.
117. See Rios-Kohn, supra note 100, at 140. 118. See Stair, supra note 11, at 831 ("[Tlhe concept of the child's best interests was boldly introduced to the Convention.").
119. See id; see Rios-Kohn, supra note 100, at 140. 120. See Rios-Kohn, supra note 100, at 141. "The treaty's importance has been attributed to the speed with which States universally accepted it and its comprehensive nature." Id.
121. See id. at 140-41. The UN Convention has been "ratified or acceded to by every country in the world with two exceptions: Somalia (which does not currently have a recognized government) and the United States (which has signed but not yet become a State Party to the Convention)." Id. U.S. refusal to join the UN Convention is apparently rooted in a policy of reluctance to bind the U.S. to international treaties pertaining to human rights. See Barone, supra note 36, at 120; see also id. at n.21 I (expressing U.S. concern over the effect human rights treaties might have on domestic policy); Reisman, supra note 8, at 349 (pointing out that the U.S. reluctance to ratify the UN Convention is due to concerns that the provisions might "conflict with national security concerns").
122. Rios-Kohn, supra note 100, at 141.
[Vol. 12:2 THE UN-COMMON LAW the "most comprehensive and detailed international human rights charter to date." 123 The UN Convention is made up of a preamble and fifty-four articles.' 24 Its logistics reflect an attempt to protect all children as well as to recognize the child as having human rights interests.12 Essentially, the document combines political, civil, economic, and social rights in order to "improve the situation of children."' 26 The UN Convention applies to every child below the age of eighteen (unless a younger age of majority applies), and member nations are required to guarantee the rights set out in the treaty.
2 7 The heart of the treaty is found in Articles 2, 3, 6, and 12---collectively referred to as the "soul of the treaty."' 2 8 For purposes of this note, articles 3 and 12 are noteworthy. Article 3 of the UN Convention is widely responsible for solidifying the concept that in all matters which concern a child, the "best interests" of the child are to remain the primary concern."' This concept is a frequently employed idea within many nations' family law structures, including custody cases. The term "best interests" is not defined in the UN Convention, but remains one of its "core values", assuring that in every action affecting a child, his/her best interests are given due consideration.
3
The intent of the "best interests" component is not to guarantee that a child's best interests will prevail in adjudicatory proceedings, but rather to ensure that the child's interests are given the appropriate consideration in light of any competing interests."' This approach acknowledges the recognition of the child as possessor of certain rights which entitles him/her to consideration of any interests that may be affected.' 32 In other words, "best interests" represents the 123. Id. 124. See UN Convention, supra note 99. 125. See Rios-Kohn, supra note 100, at 141 (the child is a "holder of human rights and fundamental freedoms").
126. See id. at 141-42 (incorporating these rights into the UN Convention "provides a holistic framework to improve the situation of children").
127. See UN Convention, supra note 99, arts. 1 & 2. Article 1 defines a child as "every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier." Id. at art. 1. Article 2 sets forth the duty imposed upon signatory nations as one that "shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind..." Id. at art. 2.
128. Rios-Kohn, supra note 100, at 143. 129. See UN Convention, supra note 99, art. 3. Article 3 states: "In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration." Id.
130. See id.; Rios-Kohn, supra note 100, at 144 (Article 3 "reaffirms a core value of the treaty").
131. See Rios-Kohn, supra note 100, at 144-45 (noting the difficulty often involved in balancing the competing interests of society, family, and children).
132. Meanwhile, Article 12 requires that signatory nations create mechanisms to ensure that children have opportunities to be heard and considered in all decision-making procedures which affect their lives. " The intent behind this "right to participate" is to make sure that the child's views play a relevant role in the decision-making process during proceedings having a direct affect on a child's life.' 35 The fundamental significance of Article 12 is to "stress that no implementation system may be carried out and be effective without the intervention of children in the decisions affecting their lives."'" Accordingly, the child maintains the right to express his/her views in relation to family matters, which changes the traditional manner that children were viewed in such situations.
3 7 Indeed, the delicate balance may lie between "the child as the holder of fundamental rights and freedoms and the child as the recipient of special protection designed to ensure his/her harmonious development as individuals and to help the child play a constructive role in society."' 3 Thus, what underlies Article 12's significance is its recognition of a child's right (and ability) to participate; sharing the "new vision" that children are no longer viewed as mere by-standers, but instead are "full participants in all activities that affect them.'
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C. Incorporated Principles of the UN Convention & the Children's Rights Concept
The UN Convention's principles overlap with other areas of international law. For example, the child's best interests concept permits a nation to actually play a role in matters arising from the illegal transfer of a child abroad." The child now has the internationally recognized right to express his/her views in all matters that affect him/her in conjunction with that child's age and maturity level.' 4 ' Because of the near universal acceptance of this concept, even nations not participating with the UN Convention may nonetheless incorporate its principles. Indeed, there is suggestion that these 133. See id. at 144. 134. See UN Convention, supra note 99, art. 12. Article 12 requires that: "State Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child." Id. In the U.S., the universal nature and acceptance of the UN Convention may afford U.S. courts the ability to use the treaty as persuasive authority.
See
3
In fact, U.S. courts often use best interests standards in resolving many domestic law custody disputes.'" However, when the nature of these disputes involve international implications, U.S. courts tend to abandon the UN Convention's persuasiveness even though the Hague Convention may permit such considerations.
1 4 1 This approach has led some commentators to suggest that new legislation in the U.S. (maybe legislation which adopts the essential principles of the UN Convention) could help in the area of international custody disputes by recognizing that even when parents do battle, children still have civil rights-"especially the right to have their best interests represented in custody battles."'" The next two sections of this note take a comparative look at how the overlap of children' s rights concepts are evolving with respect to Hague Convention cases in the U.S. and the U.K. 143. See id. at 160. 144. See Starr, supra note 11, at 829 (noting that "every state in the U.S. has custody laws enacted that rely on the 'best interests of the child' in making custody determinations").
IV. THE UNITED STATES APPROACH
A. Overview
145. See Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 13. Recall that both the grave riskof harm and the child's objection exceptions both afford discretion upon the court to consider matters affecting the child, which if proper under the circumstances, will permit the court to refuse ordering a child's return to its place of habitual residence. See id. However, since the Hague Convention is primarily jurisdictional in nature, the U.S. tends to "punt" on certain aspects of its domestic child custody system. See Starr, supra note 11, at 832.
146. Starr, supra note 11, at 832. Lagging behind in the promotion of children's rights, Starr suggested that new "U.S. federal law could lead the way towards giving children a voice in international custody disputes." Id. Others have suggested that the U.S. should adopt the UN Convention. See Barone, supra note 36, at 120 (suggesting that U.S. adoption of the UN Convention would have the most "significant impact" on children's rights with respect to international child abductions in the U.S.). Convention according to a return the child "at all costs" approach. 4 ' The trend with respect to the grave risk of harm exception is that even if the potential for harm is found to exist, courts will look to potential safeguards provided by the requesting nation so that it can still send the child back.
149
Denying a return request under the child's objection exception is virtually nonexistent in the U.S., with courts ordering the return of children approximately ninety percent of the time in Hague Convention cases filed in U.S. courts. 5°W hile remaining religiously committed to the Hague Convention's goal of securing the "prompt return" of abducted or wrongfully retained children, U.S. courts tend to neglect one of its other purposes-"to protect the interests of children who have been abducted."'' Unlike the trend now emerging in the U.K. (which is discussed in Part V), Part IV will illustrate how the U.S. courts pay little attention to the way the interests of the child should be handled in a Hague Convention proceeding.
B. Judicial Interpretations
Judicial holdings in the U.S. interpret the Hague Convention exceptions sparingly in order to avoid dealing with underlying custody issues, to secure the prompt return of the child, and to reinforce the Hague Convention's intent of deterring parents from forum shopping for more favorable treatment.' 52 U.S. courts do not adopt a uniform interpretation, and in order to satisfy either the grave risk or child's objection exceptions, the parent objecting to an ordered return must offer clear and convincing evidence. 149. See id.
150. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 134. Accusing U.S. courts of adopting a "nationally blind" view in Hague Convention cases, Johnson notes that the U.S. "returns roughly 90% of the children in Hague cases brought in U.S. courts and sometimes simply hands over children to foreign parents through ex parte maneuvers not even involving a Hague hearing or any other semblance of due process of law." Id.
151. Nelson, supra note 148, at 688; see also Hague Convention, supra note 10, Preamble (the opening line to the Hague Convention acknowledges that "the interests of children are of paramount importance"). [Vol. 12:2 THE UN-COMMON LAW
Determining Grave Risk of Harm
The Hague Convention expresses that a requested court is under no duty to order the return of a child if, in doing so, there exists a grave risk of exposing "the child to physical or psychological harm." 1 4 Where the risk clearly implicates physical harm (i.e. physical or sexual abuse), courts generally agree that this exception is met. 5 ' However, where the risk posed involves potential psychological harm, the consensus breaks down. 56 This is due in part to the clear and convincing evidentiary standard that must be satisfied, and the subsequent difficulty in meeting this burden that is encountered by many courts. 57 The U.S. approach can be broken down into two realms: 1) the traditional rule as espoused by the Sixth Circuit in Freidrich v. Friedrich;'" 8 and 2) the modem "further analysis approach" recently set forth by the Second Circuit in Blondin v. DuBois. 59 The Freidrich' ° decision is an often-cited case on the use of the Article 13(b) exception to the Hague Convention.' 6 ' The Freidrich court began its analysis by noting that the exception must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 62 In addition, the court sought to. remain vigilant to the objectives of the Hague Convention by placing emphasis on the use of the term "intolerable situation" within the exception's language. 63 The court refused to interpret the exception as one that looks at which location offers the child greater opportunities or makes the child happiest. 6 " Instead, the court opined that "It]he exception for grave harm to the child is not license for a court in the abducted-to country to speculate on where the child would be happiest. That decision is a custody matter, and reserved to the court in the country of habitual residence."' 65 154. Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 13(b). 155. See Nelson, supra note 148, at 677. "Most courts agree that if the child is physically harmed, through assault or sexual abuse, the grave risk exception is met." Id. 
Id.
The Eighth Circuit's interpretations are similar; the court is not to consider custody matters or the best interests of the child.' 66 It is not relevant whether the abducting parent has a good reason for fleeing. 67 Article 13(b) only "requires an assessment of whether the child will face immediate and substantial risk of an intolerable situation if he is returned."' 16 1 Courts must assume that courts in the abducted-from nations are just as capable of resolving custody disputes as are courts in the U.S. 6 9 Accordingly, the grave risk of harm exception can exist in only two situations: 1) when return puts the child in imminent danger prior to custody resolution; and 2) in serious cases of abuse or neglect, or when the court in the returned-to country is unwilling or incapable of affording adequate protection to the child. 7 Evidence, therefore, "is only relevant if it helps prove the existence of one of these two situations."'' Allegations and proof of mere adjustment problems (if the child is ordered to return) simply do not rise to the level of the grave risk exception, and are not to be considered in resolving Hague Convention proceedings. Building upon these notions, the Second Circuit recently added a subsequent analysis to this approach, specifically in relation to what a court is supposed to do once grave risk is found to exist. In Blondin, the court set forth what is referred to as the "further analysis approach."' 73 Prior to the Blondin decision, most U.S. courts that found a grave risk of harm to exist refused to order the return of the child "if abuse or severe neglect would be awaiting them on return."' 7 4 The Second Circuit began its approach by noting that a paramount purpose of the Hague Convention is to preserve comity among nations, and to deter an abducting parent from crossing international lines seeking more sympathetic courts. "' The court found that a grave risk of harm did exist, 176 however, this did not end the court's inquiry. The court stated that further inquiry was needed and looked at whether it could nevertheless honor the Hague Convention by affording certain protections 166 176. In Blondin, the mother wrongfully removed her two children from France in order to protect them from a physically abusive environment. See id. at 242. The mother had been the victim of domestic violence, and the children had been subjected to physical abuse on occasion as well. See id. at 242-44.
[Vol. 12:2 THE UN-COMMON LAW which allow the custodial decisions to still be made by the home nation. 77 The court opined that for the sake of comity, courts must be able to presume that the courts in another nation will be capable of safeguarding children. 7 ' In other words, even if the court finds the grave risk of harm exception to be applicable, Blondin has imparted an additional duty upon the courts to inquire into potential protective processes that may be available in order to permit the court to return the child to its habitual residence and still allow the resolution of any custody matters to take place there. 79 However, critics worry that this "further analysis" approach only imposes additional limitations on an already limited application of the grave risk exception."° It is argued that if the drafters of the Hague Convention had intended an additional analysis, they would have required one in the language of Article 13(b). 81 Nonetheless, the "further analysis" approach reflects the modem trend in interpreting the grave risk of harm exception in the U.S.' 82
Considering a Child's Objection
Article 13 of the Hague Convention allows courts to refuse ordering the return of a child if that child objects to being returned and is old enough and mature enough to have his/her views considered." 3 In the U.S., analysis under the child's objection exception is fairly straightforward -for the most part, it does not exist. U.S. courts are not likely to defer to a child's objection as a reason for denying a Hague Convention petition." Of course, the unique attribute of this exception is its direct entanglement with principles of the UN Convention.' For example, this exception affords a child the opportunity to 177 . See id. at 242. The court concluded "that the Hague Convention requires a more complete analysis of the full panoply of arrangements that might allow the children to be returned to the country from which they were (concededly) wrongfully abducted, in order to allow the courts of that nation an opportunity to adjudicate custody." Id.
178. See id. at 249. 179. See id. at 242. The Second Circuit believes that by requiring courts to perform the additional duty of examining all potential safeguards that the requesting nation may have in place to protect children in potentially dangerous situations, U.S. courts can still fulfill the intentions of the Hague Convention by: 1) returning children to their nations of habitual residence; and at the same time 2) protect children from any grave risk of harm they might otherwise be subject to. 
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communicate his/her views in a matter that will directly affect his/her welfare.' 86 Even though this is a fundamental right according to the UN Convention (of which the U.S. is not a part of), decisions regarding this exception in the U.S. lack any resemblance to suggestive inquiries, and typically "address issues concerning the child's views within the framework of the 'grave risk of harm' exception."' 7 The Hague Convention does not set forth a specific age for when this exception applies, and commentators have suggested that no such threshold age should be applied."a Nonetheless, when applying this exception U.S. courts tend to "assume" when a child is mature enough or old enough to have his/her views considered with very little, if any, supporting analysis. For example, in Tahan in Kansas at least afforded a ten year-old the opportunity for an in-camera interview, but the court cited to Tahan regarding the age of the child and then added that the child had no "valid" objection; yet failed to explain why. The U.S. approach to the child's objection exception reinforces concerns that critics have expressed concerning the Hague Convention's willing disregard to afford some consideration to the child's point of view.
94
Although the U.S. is not a member, the U.S. approach essentially ignores basic human rights guarantees bestowed upon many nations by the UN Convention. The U.S. appears to be simply unwilling to consider the views of the child in connection with a Hague Convention case. Furthermore, it should be clear from the aforementioned that even if U.S. courts were to begin taking consideration of a child's objections, no process exists by which to gauge the manner such considerations are to be given due consideration. 196 In Turner v. Frowein, the mother (a U.S. citizen) and father (a Dutch citizen) were married in Connecticut but spent a significant amount of time living apart, splitting their residence between New York City and Connecticut.' 97 The couple had only one child who, by the time the Hague Convention proceedings were initiated, was seven years-old.' 98 The marriage experienced several episodes of domestic violence over the years, but when the mother indicated she was going to file for divorce, the husband retaliated by taking the child and telling the mother she would never see their son again.' However, the couple managed to begin reconciliation and subsequently moved to Holland. 2 00 What happened next was unconscionable. The father commit-ted several acts of sexual abuse against his son, at which time the mother attempted to institute divorce and custody proceedings in Holland. 20 ' Finding no success, the mother fled to the U.S. with her son and filed for divorce, at which point the father then initiated Hague Convention proceedings.
2
The court had no problem recognizing the existence of a grave risk of harm in the form of sexual abuse. 20 3 However, the court made clear that this would not end the inquiry. 2°4 Referring to the importance of guaranteeing that a court in the child's place of habitual residence retain proper jurisdiction over custodial matters, the court mandated the adoption of Blondin's "further analysis approach. 2 5 The court held that a judge cannot deny a Hague Convention petition under the grave risk of harm exception unless it has evaluated the "full range of placement options and legal safeguards that might facilitate the child's repatriation under conditions that would ensure his or her safety." ' 206 The court further suggested that possible considerations included whether the abducting parent or an acceptable third party could retain supervision if the child were ordered returned, and whether the requesting nation was able to enforce any conditions attached to an order of return.
2 7 The court then ordered the case remanded for such "further analysis. 2 0 8
In England v. England, both parents were U.S. citizens and were married and lived in Texas until 1997.2" The couple had two daughters, ages thirteen and four. 210 In 1997, the father took a job in Australia and the family moved there. 21 ' In 1999, the family came back to the U.S. on vacation, but when the mother's father became seriously ill, both the mother and the children remained in the U.S. after the vacation ended while the father returned to Australia. 21 2 Shortly thereafter, the mother filed for divorce in Texas and advised the father that neither she nor the children would be returning to Australia. 213 The father then commenced Hague Convention proceedings seeking return of his daughters to Australia. 1 4
The mother affirmatively employed the grave risk of psychological harm exception and asked the court to consider the express wishes of the oldest daughter. 215 The court quickly disposed of the grave risk of harm claim by noting there must be more evidence presented than simply that ordering the return will somehow unsettle the children.
216 As far as the child's objection exception, the court overruled the lower court's finding that the thirteen yearold, who had clearly objected to being returned to Australia, was old enough and mature enough for the court to consider her views. 2 7 Moreover, the court's only basis for reaching its conclusion was that since the oldest child was adopted, was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD), possessed certain learning disabilities, and had prior parental figures in her life, that she must be confused by her present situation [Vol. 12:2 THE UN-COMMON LAW Concerned about this assumption, the dissenting judge questioned why such little deference was given to the trial court's determination. 2t 9 The dissent was further troubled by the majority's disregard for the fact that if the child's objection exception is "to have any meaning at all, it must be available for a child who is less than 16 years old." ' 20 The dissent warned of the "frightening precedent that the majority opinion in this case will set," obviously distressed by the majority's indifference to the fact-specific attention enjoyed by the trial court judge.
2 2 '
V. THE UNITED KINGDOM APPROACH
A. Overview
The Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 is the enabling legislation giving statutory effect to the Hague Convention in the U.K.
2 22 In part, the U.K. approach to the children's rights aspects of the Hague Convention is similar to that of the U.S., but only with respect to the grave risk of harm exception. The courts in the U.K. require the grave risk of harm be of some caliber beyond that caused by the inherent unpleasantries resulting from the abduction. 223 This reiterates the usual concern over not wanting to reward the abducting parent for his/her actions. However, with respect to the child's objection exception, the U.K. is said to provide the most "extensive analysis." ' 224 Unlike in the U.S., the determination of whether the child is old enough or mature enough to have his/her objections considered is not determined by a judge's interview (or assumptions for that matter) with the child. 225 Instead, a child welfare officer is appointed by the court to examine the child and then present the findings to the court. 226 This is by no means dispositive, though, since even if an objecting child is found to assert a valid . In addition to requiring proof by "clear and compelling evidence," the grave risk of harm must be of such severity "which is much in ore than is inherent in the inevitable disruption, uncertainty and anxiety which follows an unwelcome return to the jurisdiction of the court of habitual residence." Id.
224. See Nanos, supra note 81, at 450. 
